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　　In studying both the recurrence of special habits or ideas in several districts, and their prevalence within each district, there come before us ever-reiterated proofs of regular causation producing the phenomena of human life, and of laws of maintenance and diffusion conditions of society, at definite stages of culture. But, while giving full importance to the evidence bearing on these standard conditions of society, let us be careful to avoid a pitfall which may entrap the unwary student. Of course, the opinions and habits belonging in common to masses of mankind are to a great extent the results of sound judgment and practical wisdom. But to a great extent it is not so.

　　That many numerous societies of men should have believed in the influence of the evil eye and the existence of a firmament, should have sacrificed slaves and goods to the ghosts of the departed, should have handed down traditions of giants slaying monsters and men turning into beasts—all this is ground for holding that such ideas were indeed produced in men’s minds by efficient causes, but it is not ground for holding that the rites in question are profitable, the beliefs sound, and the history authentic. This may seem at the first glance a truism, but, in fact, it is the denial of a fallacy which deeply affects the minds of all but a small critical minority of mankind. Popularly, what everybody says must be true, what everybody does must be right.

　　There are various topics, especially in history, law, philosophy, and theology, where even the educated people we live among can hardly be brought to see that the cause why men do hold an opinion, or practise a custom, is by no means necessarily a reason why they ought to do so. Now collections of ethnographic evidence, bringing so prominently into view the agreement of immense multitudes of men as to certain traditions, beliefs, and usages, are peculiarly liable to be thus improperly used in direct defense of these institutions themselves, even old barbaric nations being polled to maintain their opinions against what are called modern ideas.

　　As it has more than once happened to myself to find my collections of traditions and beliefs thus set up to prove their own objective truth, without proper examination of the grounds on which they were actually received, I take this occasion of remarking that the same line of argument will serve equally well to demonstrate, by the strong and wide consent of nations, that the earth is flat, and night-mare the visit of a demon.

　　1. The author’s attitude towards the phenomena mentioned at the beginning of the text is one of _____.

　　[A] skepticism [B] approval [C] indifference [D] disgust

　　2. By “But to...it is not so”(Line 7) the author implies that _____.

　　[A] most people are just followers of new ideas

　　[B] even sound minds may commit silly errors

　　[C] the popularly supported may be erroneous

　　[D] nobody is immune to the influence of errors

　　3.Which of the following is closest in meaning to the statement “There are various... to do so” (Line 17-20)?

　　[A] Principles of history and philosophy are hard to deal with.

　　[B] People like to see what other people do for their own model.

　　[C] The educated are more susceptible to errors in their daily life.

　　[D] That everyone does the same may not prove they are all right.

　　4. Which of the following did the author probably suggest?

　　[A] Support not the most supported.

　　[B] Deny everything others believe.

　　[C] Throw all tradition into trashcan.

　　[D] Keep your eyes open all the time.

　　5. The author develops his writing mainly by means of _____.

　　[A] reasoning [B] examples [C] comparisons [D] quotations

　　答案

　　1. A 2.C 3.D 4.D 5.A

　　總體分析

　　本文是一篇說(shuō)明大多數(shù)人共有的特殊習(xí)慣和觀(guān)念并不一定合理的看法的文章。作者駁斥了認(rèn)為大家共有的就是正確的這種錯(cuò)誤觀(guān)點(diǎn)，提倡批判性思維。

　　第一段：作者指出，在研究中發(fā)現(xiàn)特殊的習(xí)慣和觀(guān)念一定程度上反映了人類(lèi)社會(huì)的某些規(guī)律，但它們并非一定是合理的判斷和智慧的結(jié)果。因此我們應(yīng)小心謹(jǐn)慎地看待它們。

　　第二段：許多傳統(tǒng)和習(xí)俗的盛行，不足以說(shuō)明它們的合理性和真實(shí)性。認(rèn)為大家都說(shuō)的話(huà)是真的，大家都做的事是對(duì)的，這是一種謬論。

　　第三段：在很多領(lǐng)域即使是受過(guò)教育的人也無(wú)法清楚地理解這一事實(shí)，即人們持有的共同觀(guān)點(diǎn)、形成的共同習(xí)俗等不一定正確。

　　第四段：應(yīng)在接受某種傳綜和信仰前對(duì)其依據(jù)仔細(xì)審視，否則會(huì)認(rèn)為謬論也是真理。