Text 5
Japanese firms have achieved the highest levels of manufacturing efficiency in the world automobile industry. (46) Some observers of Japan have assumed that Japanese firms use the same manufacturing equipment and techniques as United States firms but have benefited from the unique characteristics of Japanese employees and the Japanese culture. However, if this were true, then one would expect Japanese auto plants in the United States to perform no better than factories run by United States companies. This is not the case. (47) Japanese-run automobile plants located in the United States and staffed by local workers have demonstrated higher levels of productivity when compared with factories owned by United States companies.
Other observers link high Japanese productivity to higher levels of capital investment per worker. But a historical perspective leads to a different conclusion. (48) When the two top Japanese automobile makers matched and then doubled United States productivity levels in the mid-sixties, capital investment per employee was comparable to that of United States firms. Furthermore, by the late seventies, the amount of fixed assets required to produce one vehicle was roughly equivalent in Japan and in the United States. Since capital investment was not higher in Japan, it had to be other factors that led to higher productivity.
A more fruitful explanation may lie with Japanese production techniques. Japanese automobile producers did not simply implement conventional processes more effectively, they made critical change in United States procedures. (49) For instance, the mass-production philosophy of United States automakers encouraged the production of huge lots of cars in order to utilize fully expensive, component-specific equipment and to occupy fully workers who have been trained to execute one operation efficiently. Japanese automakers chose to make small-lot production feasible by introducing several departures from United States practices, including the use of flexible equipment that could be altered easily to do several different production tasks and the training of workers in multiple jobs. (50) Automakers could schedule the production of different components or models on single machines, thereby eliminating the need to store the spare stocks of extra components that result when specialized equipment and workers are kept constantly active.
參考譯文
46. 一些日本觀(guān)察家認(rèn)為，盡管日本公司使用與美國(guó)公司一樣的制造設(shè)備和工藝方法，但卻由于日本雇員和日本文化的獨(dú)有特征而受益匪淺。
47. 設(shè)在美國(guó)并雇用當(dāng)?shù)毓と说挠扇毡救碎_(kāi)辦的汽車(chē)廠(chǎng)，與美國(guó)公司擁有的汽車(chē)廠(chǎng)相比，其生產(chǎn)效率要高得多。
48. 20世紀(jì)60年代中期，兩家最大的日本汽車(chē)制造商開(kāi)始與美國(guó)的生產(chǎn)效率并駕齊驅(qū)，而后來(lái)則為美國(guó)生產(chǎn)效率的兩倍，而每位員工計(jì)算的資金投入?yún)s與美國(guó)不相上下。
49. 例如，美國(guó)汽車(chē)制造商的規(guī)模生產(chǎn)的經(jīng)營(yíng)方針鼓勵(lì)大量生產(chǎn)汽車(chē)，以便充分利用價(jià)格昂貴的零件專(zhuān)用設(shè)備并使受過(guò)培訓(xùn)、高效操作某一生產(chǎn)程序的工人不停的干活。
50. 汽車(chē)工人能夠在一臺(tái)機(jī)器上安排生產(chǎn)不同零件或不同型號(hào)的部件，這樣就不必額外儲(chǔ)存部件作為備用件，而當(dāng)專(zhuān)用設(shè)備和專(zhuān)業(yè)工人不停的工作時(shí)，就必須有這種備用件的儲(chǔ)存。
Text 6
The technological revolutions of the last two decades have placed a severe burden on the concept of technology transfer. It is quite clear that the concept has serious limitations; with time, it is not at all clear that its methods have improved or its result progressed.
(1)The underlying assumption in “technology transfer” is that the application of new discoveries to the development of new technology by the developed countries produces results which are applicable to underdeveloped countries. Although this assumption has never really been put to a true global test, it is by now clear that this cannot be the main means of technological progress in developing areas such as Africa, Southeast Asian and Latin America, irrespective of its possible utility elsewhere. (2) The question is whether such an outcome is inevitable and inherent in the process or whether it merely reflects the shortage of resources and improper management. It is my contention that “technology transfer” as a vehicle of progress for the developing countries is irreparably flawed and cannot succeed.
The fundamental flaw is that “technology transfer” is cast in the die of a colonial process whereby developed countries do things in ways that they find acceptable for their former colonies, the developing countries. (3) Whether the development process is carried out by citizens of the recipient nation or not is irrelevant; the philosophy upon which” technology transfer” is based, beginning with training and ending with application, is composed of a set of socio-culturally and economically determined values within the institutionalized fabric of science, which select the questions found to be meaningful, dictate the preferred research plans and evaluate the significance only of the results obtained.
Clearly, technology based on the set of determinants is not likely to be very relevant to the vastly different economic and socio-cultural conditions of developing countries. It will hardly get to the needs of the developing countries, perhaps even serving to slow progress.
(4) This situation must be replaced by a new process which might be called “basic knowledge transfer” as part of growth of a forefront science in the developing countries. This approach contains the following features:
• Given full access to new scientific discovery at the cutting edge of science, that is, at the region of high intensity transfer from basic to applied knowledge, the scientists of developing countries can create their own technology transfer from basic to applied.
